The PARADOX of human society -that it has unity and continuity of its own and yet exists solely in the minds and action of its members -can be resolved only by understanding how the NEWBORN individual is molded into a social being. Without this process of molding the society could not perpetuate itself beyond a single generation and culture could not exist. Nor could the individual become a person; for without the ever-repeated renewal of culture within him there could be no human mentality, no human personality. Both the person and the society are alike dependent on this unique process of molding.
The principle that the "child follows the bed" is coupled in the hadith with the declaration that "the adulterer gets nothing. (Note 5) that is that the child belongs to its mother's husband at the time of its birth even if he should not be the father. Shi ite law goes so far as to say that the paternity of a child conceived adulterously is attributed to the husband unless he disavows it formally by pronouncement of the li'an against his wife. If a father repent of his disavowal later and desires to acknowledge his paternity, that is permitted. In any event, the adulterer cannot claim paternity of the child.
In Islamic law it is sufficient for the father to acknowledge cohabitation with his wife or slave girl to establish the legitimacy of the child. If circumstances (such as the question of succession) require the mother to prove a child to be hers, her statement must be supported by that of midwife or some other respectable Muslim woman present at the birth. As concubinage is lawful in Islam, therefore, it is not necessary for the mother of a child to be married to its father in order for it to be declared legitimate. Children born of a marriage which is subsequently declared irregular remain legitimate if the parents can prove they contracted the marriage in good faith and believing they were entitled to be married. Also, in case of error, or where there is a doubt that the child was begotten in wedlock or during a master's lawful ownership of a slave-girl, the child is declared legitimate.
In case of repudiation of children by parents, if a husband suspects that the born by his wife is none of his, and he does not wish to acknowledge it, he is must denounce it immediately it is born, follow up his denunciation with an accusation of adultery against his wife in accordance with the procedure of Li'an. He cannot, however, denounce the child simply on ground that it does not resemble him in appearance. As quoted that a Bedouin came to the Prophet declaring that his wife had given birth to a negro child, and hinting that he wish to repudiate it. The Holy Prophet, however, refused him permission to do so, and remarked that the differences even of the colour do not prove adultery, and the woman's husband is not entitled to divorce her. (Note 6) If a child is disavowed by the husband of the mother it reckons descent from her alone; and similarly if the husband's kinfolk dispute, with a show of proof, that the child is his. Normally, indeed, the legitimacy of the child is a matter of some concern to the father's family or tribe, and where there is a special reason for guarding the purity of the family, claims to belong to it is scrutinized with some care. The following example from the early of Islam is quoted from the Kitab-al-Aghani. The family of 'Ali b. Jahm al-Sami, court poet to the Caliph Mutawakkil, claimed that they were descended from a member of the Quraysh known as Sama. The genealogists of the Quraysh, however, refused to accept the family of the poet as kin to them, saying that when Sama died his widow married a man from another tribe, and that the person from whom the poet's family claimed descent was a child of this second marriage. (Note 7)
The law refuses to recognize external claims to paternity of a child which its mother's husband has disavowed, and in such case no blood relationship between the child and the person claiming to be its father is in law recognized.
GUARDIANSHIP
On the question of responsibility for the support of the children the Holy Quran makes very valuable regulations. It is conceivable that where the parents live together there remains no need to formulate any laws on the subject, particularly where children are regarded as precious possessions. The need arises when matters become complicated by the divorce of the mother. In this regard the two sections of the Holy Quran, dealing with divorce and related matters, are noteworthy. In these two sections it is laid down that a mother should suckle her child for two full years at least, during which time she should be fed and clothed by the father, though neither parent can be unduly pressed for the support of the children. (Note 8) The earlier passage, related to the maintenance of children definitely impose no compulsion on the divorced mother to suckle her child, and if she undertakes it she is entitled to a fee for her services likely any other wet-nurse who may be hired. This is the openion of Hanafi school of thought. (Note 9) Others, basing their opinion on the later passage, hold that mothers, married or divorced, are compelled to suckle their children. Still others, for example the Malikites, are of the opinion that a married mother is compelled to suckle her child for the specified period, but a divorced mother need not. (Note 10) It is to be mentioned too, that the period of two years laid down by the Holy Quran may be lessened to a time agreed upon by both parents. (Note 11) When parents are living together they are jointly responsible for upholding of their children, the father providing material necessities, and the mother caring for the welfare of their bodies and for their mental and religious training. (Note 12) In case of dispute the mother has the right to custody of the children during their infancy. How long that period may extend is not specified in the Holy Quran, and the various schools of law accordingly provide their own ideas on the subject. In the view of the Shi,`ites, the mother, provided she is a free woman and a Muslim, has a charge of child for the first two years of its life while it is at the breast. After weaning the child is to be entrusted entirely to the custody of his father, a girl until she is seven years old to that of her mother. After that age the father takes charge of the daughters too. If the mother dies before the boy is of two years old or the daughter of seven years, then the father takes charge; as he does also if he divorce the mother of the child. If the father dies, the mother takes charge.
The Shi,`ite school agrees that the mother has first right to the custody of the child until the age of seven years. It is considered that at that age the child has the power to discriminate, and it can then chose with which parent it live for the future. However, the mother must be a free Muslim woman, in full possession of her senses, innocent of misdemeanor, trustworthy; having a fixed abode and not married to a man other than the child's father.
According to the Malikitees, guardianship of a boy continues with his mother until his puberty; of a girl, until the obligation to maintain her ceases i.e. until the consummation of her marriage. The mother even is an infidel, a divorced woman or a widow. (Note 13)
The age of puberty is not fixed in the Holy Quran, although it is indicated that a youth reached manhood when nocturnal emissions began. The majority of the legal schools agree upon the age of fifteen as being for a boy the age when he reaches manhood. A hadith narrates that 'Abdullah ibn Omar, once told a freedman of his that the Prophet, after the Uhad, had refused him a share of the spoils because he was too young to participate, he being then fourteen years old. But a year later, after the battle of the Trench, he was granted his share. (Note 14)
The particular age of fifteen years is set as the legal term of manhood if there is doubt about the physical signs of puberty. If these physical signs can be proved, then an earlier age may be accepted; though nine years is the lowest limit. For a girl similarly, either the legal age of fifteen years or the regular indication of puberty is taken to mean the definite attainment of womanhood. Abu Hanifa preferred the age of eighteen as the legal of manhood, and declared that where a youth was in the care of a guardian whom he could not satisfy about his capacity to have the disposition of his own property, the period of minority might be deferred for seven years longer, i.e. until the age of twenty five. (Note 15) During the period of their minority, children have no power to dispose their persons or their property. Accordingly they are then nominally in the charge of an elder whose tutelage may be of three kinds. The firs kind is that concerned with the care of the infants, and here the parents are jointly concerned. If the mother is divorced, it is she who is entrusted with their care until they reach a particular age -either two years old or seven, according to different schools. If the mother dies before the child has reached the age of seven, her maternal grand mother takes charge. Only if these relatives are not available is the father entrusted with the care of the child up to age of seven. If the parents are both living but are divorced, those schools of law which consider seven years to be an age at which has a power to discriminate, permit it then to choose whether it will live with its father or mother. Only if the parent chosen is a Muslim of full age and free can he or she undertake the guardianship of the child. If the mother marries a man outside the circle of child's kinsfolk she is incapacitated from acting as guardian.
Closely bound up with the first form of guardianship is the second, which is concerned with providing children with spouse when they have reached the right age. The guardian from this aspect is the Wali. It is the father here who has the first right to the office and then the nearest male kinsman. As wali the guardian must be a Muslim of full age. A Christian father who has a Muslim daughter could not dispose of her in marriage.
The third form of guardianship is that which is concerned with the care and management of the property of minors. Here too, it is the privilege of the father to exercise guardianship failing him; it falls to the grandfather's will. Males alone have the right to the office, but some legists consider that the claim of an infant's mother to be the guardian is entitled to consideration.
The guardian of an orphan has the power which are similar to, though less extensive than, those possessed by a father. A marriage contracted by the latter for his infant son is valid when the latter reaches marriageable age; but any other wali's contract could be set a side by a ward at coming his age. A minor, however, may not
INHERITANCE
In pre-Islamic era the system of inheritance was confined to the male agnate relatives ("asaba") of the deceased. The Quranic regulations on this subject introduced the novel and outstanding reforms of permitting woman to inherit from their kinsmen. The details of Islamic laws of inheritance may be studied under the subject of INHERITANCE in law books of Islamic jurisprudence. Our concern here is only with the rights of sons and daughters. A testator may make bequests to the extent of not more than one third of his or her property remaining after payment of all debts. (Note 20) Out of the rest, or if he dies intestate out of the balance left after payment of all debts, the persons mentioned in the Holy Quran as being entitled to "shares" receive them, and the remainder then goes to the sons, if there are any. There is no mentioned in the Holy Quran of any right accruing to a first-born son and all sons inherit equal portions of their father estate. Where, in addition to sons there are alsi daughters, the latter, by the Holy Quran, receive "shares" in the proportion of one to every two received by the sons. (Note 21) Daughters are amongst the persons who are especially mentioned in the holy Quran as entitled to "shares." Where there are no sons, an only daughter receives one half of the estate after the necessary deductions have been made for debts, etc., and two or more daughters receive between them two thirds. Where there is no other legal heir, some codes assign the remainder of the estate also to the daughter of the daughters, though other deny their title to it. According to Islamic law of inheritance no son or daughter can be excluded from inheritance by any mistaken calculation of the amount of the "shares" allotted by the testator or by any law.
However, certain disabilities have been regulated by the legists and the interpreters of the Holy Quran, to preclude undesirable persons from inheritance. Thus no person can inherit from another whom he has slain, either by design or by accident. (Note 22) The apostasy of an heir exclude him from any legacy, and so also would the fact of his being a slave or an unbeliever. Bastardy only excludes from the father but not from the mother, between whom and whose children, however begotten, the ordinary rules of kinship hold. The child, therefore, can also inherit from its mother's kinsfolk. This is the law according to the Sunni schools. (Note 23)
ADOPTION
Adoption gives no right to inheritance in Islamic society. In pr-Islamic times, an adopted member of a clan or family stood on equality with true-born members of it, sharing in booty and inheritance as well as in the duties of raid. Even women could be legally adopted and share in inheritance, some times in face of the opposition of other heirs. (Note 24) Since adoption also gave a clan the right to inherit from an adopted member, persons who owned property were sometime invited to membership, even though they were regarded as of humble status. Occasionally such a person, suspecting the motives of the invitation, would refuse. (Note 25) In Islamic society adopted son was excluded from inheritance declaring that Allah had not made adopted sons real sons and they were to be called by the name of their father. (Note 26) 
